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1. Overview 
Although the agricultural area of the Syrian Arab Republic is spread over large areas of the country, 
the agricultural sector is facing many difficulties in light of deteriorating security conditions and the 
high cost of farming.  Key findings are as follows: 
 The country's diverse crops reflect its environmental and geographical areas, and include 
wheat, barley, legumes, olives, grapes, cherries, and citrus fruits.   
 Crops are susceptible for several seasons to severe ecological stresses, however, such as 
frost during initial growth stages, or to rainfall retention and high temperatures during the 
maturity stage. 
 Although the country is still plagued by frequent droughts, results for 2017 show an 
improvement in vegetation conditions in the northern crop-growing areas of Aleppo, Idleb, 
Hama and Al-Hassakeh.   
 However, “severe” moisture stress, affecting 55 to 85 per cent of crops, has been observed in 
cropland areas across the southern part of Idleb and in some parts of central and northern 
Aleppo (FAO GIEWS, 2017a).  
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 Water and its sources are an essential factor in the development of the agricultural sector, as 
well as for livestock rearing.  Due to the scarcity of resources and the low natural productivity 
of inland fishery, the fishery and aquaculture sector plays a minor role in Syrian economy.   
 Since the crisis, many irrigation canals have been destroyed.  Groundwater use in Syria is 
heavily overexploited, yet water resources receive less attention than the effects of food and 
income security. 
 Limited study results show that water issues rank highly in many sub-districts in Idleb and 
Rural Damascus governorates: because of the high cost of other irrigation methods, 45 per 
cent of agricultural sub-districts assessed by the non-government, non-profit organisation 
Assistance Coordination Unit (ACU) depend on rainwater for land irrigation (ACU, 2017: 34).   
 Before the outbreak of the crisis in 2011, the sector was a source of livelihood opportunities 
for half of the population (FAO, 2016: 1).  Today, non-IDP (internally displaced people) 
households still living in rural areas continue to depend on agriculture as their main livelihood, 
with around 80 per cent involved in annual crop production (FAO, 2017: 4). 
 Approximately 40 per cent of IDPs interviewed in the recent ‘Counting the Cost’ national 
survey have stopped crop production entirely due to high prices of inputs and insecurity (FAO, 
2017: 6).  To decrease reliance on low-quality and expensive smuggled vegetables, 
approximately a third of all residents in Rural Damascus survive by growing crops on rooftops 
after buying seeds from other areas, despite the high prices (Syria Untold, 2015).   
 Crop production is impacted by high labour costs, shortages of workers, crop destruction and 
fragmented markets, with disrupted supply chains and severe damage to grain silos and flour 
mills. 
 Data from FAO and WFP reveal that the area planted with cereals in the 2015-16 cropping 
season was the smallest to date.  
 Bread is the staple of the Syrian diet, and the Al-Hassakeh governorate in the north-east is 
still considered to be the reservoir of wheat production in the country.  However, currently 
there is a conflict here called the “wheat battle,” which is just as important as the ongoing war 
between conflicting parties in the region.   
 More than half of Syria’s public bakeries have been damaged since the start of the crisis, 
increasing bread prices by up to 1000 per cent in the hardest hit areas (WFP, 2016).   
 Today, Syria has turned from a country having strategic self-sufficiency in wheat, to an 
importer.  
 Livestock rearing has also decreased: herders lack animal feed, and veterinary services have 
been significantly reduced.  As a result, many livestock are unvaccinated and so risk 
spreading diseases into neighbouring countries. 
 Food production has dropped by 40 per cent, compared to pre-conflict levels (WFP, 2016) 
and is at a record low. 
 The state system that once subsidised and provided farmers with seeds, as well as 
purchased their crops, has been restricted by the war.   
 According to 2017 DYNAMO study results, there are no agricultural pharmacies (that provide 
basic items needed for agriculture) within 24 assessed sub-districts, even though 19 of them 
are listed as agricultural sub-districts.   
 Despite six years of war, agriculture remains a key part of the economy, however. The sector 
still accounts for an estimated 26 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP), and represents a 
“critical safety net” for the 6.7 million Syrians – including IDPs - who still remain in rural areas 
(FAO, 2017: 4).  
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 Even though the crisis is not over, the conditions for investing in the recovery of the sector are 
present in many areas of the country. There is a possibility for establishing livestock 
development projects within nearly three-quarters (73 per cent) of assessed sub-districts 
(ACU, 2017: 29).   
 Future Syrian agricultural research development programmes for farmers include: planning 
for future harvests; training with the latest technology - even for farmers who have decades of 
experience - in order to focus on new ideas, and introducing scientific advances and 
discoveries. 
 Charities and non-government organisations (NGOs) plan to eventually expand into animal 
husbandry, providing vocational training for breeders to raise sheep and goats, and assist 
them with feed and forage. 
Most of the evidence concentrates on crop production – mainly wheat.  This report includes findings 
from BSG areas such as Ar-Raqqa, Damascus, Deir-ez-Zor, Hama, Homs, Idleb, and Rural 
Damascus, as well as hard-to-reach (HTR) areas, e.g. Al-Hassakeh.  Newly accessible areas in 
Aleppo, Az-Zabdani, Lattakia, and Tartous governorates are also included.  Results for areas that 
have seen relatively little fighting e.g. As-Suwayda (Sweida), and the largely destroyed Quneitra are 
also included.  
2. Influences on crop development 
 
Source: FAO, 2017: 7
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1 Perennial crops include almonds, apples, apricots, cherries, citrus, figs, grapes, nuts, olives, peaches, pears, 
pistachios, plums and pomegranates. 
Annual crops include a range of important food (wheat), fodder (maize and barley) and cash (cotton, tobacco, 
spices and sugar beet) crops. 
4 
Geography and climatic issues 
 The country is bordered in the north by Turkey, in the east and southeast by Iraq, in the south 
by Jordan, in the southwest by Israel, and in the west by Lebanon and the Mediterranean 
Sea.  The Balikh is the longest Syrian river, while parts of the massive Tigris and Euphrates 
also pass through it.  Syria shares most of its rivers with other countries. 
 The agricultural area of the Syrian Arab Republic cover large areas of the country (ACU, 
2017:33).   
 The northeast and the southern parts of the country are important agricultural areas because 
of the abundance of water and favourable climate. 
 The country's diverse perennial and annual crops reflect its environmental and geographical 
areas (Hanna, 2016). 
 The climate is Mediterranean, characterised by a relatively short rainy and cold winter 
(December–March), and a dry and hot summer (June-August).  Crops are susceptible for 
several seasons to severe ecological stresses, such as frost, during initial growth stages, or to 
rainfall retention and high temperatures during the maturity stage. Crops are also exposed to 
irregular rainfalls, in terms of amount or distribution throughout growth season (GCSAR, 
2013). 
 Although there have been a series of severe droughts starting in the late 1990s, April 2017 
rainfall totals in Syria were largely ‘above average to average’ compared to the long-term 
average (LTA) of 2001-2016 (FAO GIEWS, 2017a).   
 ASI
2
 recordings for April 2017 show ‘improvement’ in vegetation conditions in crop-growing 
areas of Aleppo, Idleb, Hama and Al-Hassakeh (FAO GIEWS, 2017b).   
 However, signs of moisture stress were still present in these governorates throughout three 
dekads
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 of April 2017: by the last dekad of the month, signs of “severe” moisture stress, 
affecting 55 to 85 per cent of crops, was observed in cropland areas across the southern part 
of Idleb and in some parts of central and northern Aleppo (FAO GIEWS, 2017a). 
 ‘Below average precipitation’ was observed in large areas of eastern and southern parts of Al-
Hassakeh; parts of Rural Damascus, As-Suwayda and Homs; and pockets of Aleppo, Ar-
Raqqa, Idleb and along the Euphrates River in Deir-ez-Zor governorates (idib).   
 However, the southern and south-western parts of Damascus, Quneitra, Dar’a, Tartous and 
Lattakia continued to receive ‘relatively moderate’ rains in December 2016, which resulted in 
healthy crop development throughout January 2017 (FAO GIEWS, 2017a).  In Al-Hassakeh 
and Deir-ez-Zor, ‘healthy vegetation cover’ increased from December 2016 to January 2017 
(FAO GIEWS, 2017b). 
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 The Agricultural Stress Index (ASI) helps to show how “stressed” crops are (i.e. percentage of cropland area 
affected by drought) by combining vegetation condition and temperature variables.  However, since the ASI is 
based on remotely sensed data only, there is no confirmation on what crops have been planted (FAO GIEWS, 
2017b). 
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 Every month has three dekads, such that the first two dekads have 10 days (i.e., 1-10, 11-20), and the third is 
comprised of the remaining days of the month. Therefore, the length of the third dekad of each month is not 
consistent and varies from 8-11 days, depending on the length of the month (Joyce et al., 2014). 
5 
Water area and irrigation 
 Water is an essential factor in the development of the agricultural sector.  Due to irregular 
rainfalls, the agriculture sector has to rely heavily on irrigation - in particular in the northern 
governorates of Al-Hassakeh, Aleppo and Ar-Raqqa, as well as Deir-ez-Zor along the 
Euphrates (FAO, 2017: 12).  
 Latest estimates show that agriculture accounts for 87 per cent of the water withdrawn from 
Syria’s aquifers (containing groundwater), rivers and lakes (FAO AQUASTAT, 2012).   
 However, the water area in Syria (including marshes) consists of only 161,000 ha (1,610 
km
2
), which represents approximately 0.9 per cent of the total area of the country (FAO, 2017: 
4).  In southern Aleppo, the groundwater level has fallen by 1.5 m/year over the last 25 years 
(Aw-Hassan et al., 2014: 207).   
 Renewable water resources are estimated at 0.0808 ha (808 m
3
)/capita/year (ibid), which is 
below the water scarcity threshold of 0.1 ha (1000 m
3
)/capita/year (Roudi-Fahimi et al., 2002; 
FAO, 2017: 12).   
 With a rate of population growth consistent with the United Nations’ medium variant 
population projection (UN-DESA, 2013: 143), the country is estimated to approach the 
absolute water scarcity threshold of 0.05 ha (500 m
3
)/capita/year by 2050 (Aw-Hassan et al., 
2014: 205).   
 Half of Syria’s annual renewable water resources originate from cross-border flow, with the 
majority of it flowing in from Turkey by way of the Euphrates (Aw-Hassan et al., 2014: 205). 
However, both climate change and developments in neighbouring countries have already 
reduced water resources even further. 
 People in neighbourhoods held by the Syrian regime in Deir-ez-Zor do not receive enough 
water to meet their minimum daily needs.  Currently, water is pumped into the home network 
in the city for only a few hours over few days, prompting civilians to dig wells for water 
extraction (ACU, 2017: 66).   
 Previous research showed that farmers allocated water to their crops in an economically 
rational manner “in the short run” (Aw-Hassan et al., 2014: 213).  However, according to more 
recent analysis, 20 per cent of households have lost access to irrigation entirely (FAO, 2017: 
12).   
 Currently, forty per cent of households still have access to irrigation, but face higher costs due 
to increased prices and lower quantities of fuel, resulting in the use of a smaller amount of 
water (ibid).   
 In the ‘Counting the Cost’ survey, 60 per cent of households reported current significant 
damage to infrastructures such as irrigation canals, and this figure rose as high as 70–90 per 
cent in some governorates concentrated in the most irrigated areas, i.e. Al-Hassakeh, Aleppo 
and Ar-Raqqa (FAO, 2017: 13). 
 Syria Dynamic Monitoring (DYNAMO) study findings confirm that irrigation problems rank 
highly in many sub-districts in Idleb and Rural Damascus governorates (ACU, 2017: 33).   
 Because of the high cost of other irrigation methods, 45 per cent of sub-districts assessed by 
the Assistance Coordination Unit (ACU) depend on rainwater, such as Markada in Al-
Hassakeh, Ziyara in Hama, Al-Khashniyyeh in Quneitra, Qourqeena in Idleb, Tall Refaat in 
Aleppo - despite the fact that these sub-districts are agricultural sub-districts (ACU, 2017: 34).     
 Deir-ez-Zor centre, Abu Kamal, Jalaa and Susat sub-districts in Deir-ez-Zor depend 
completely on Euphrates river water (ibid). 
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 Groundwater-based agriculture comprised of 53 per cent of the total irrigated land before the 
war (MAAR, 2010).  Nowadays, groundwater in Syria is heavily overexploited:  Madaya in 
Rural Damascus, Bennsh in Idleb and Muharda in Hama depend completely on groundwater 
for land irrigation (ACU, 2017: 34).   
 However, the effects of such expansion on the sustainability of water resources receive less 
attention than the effects on food and income security in rural livelihoods (Aw-Hassan et al., 
2014: 205). 
Livestock 
 Awasi sheep comprised the majority of the livestock population before the crisis; cattle and 
goat populations were smaller (FAO, 2017, 9).  Commercial poultry was an important source 
of employment (FAO, 2017: 9). 
 Today, however, livestock numbers have decreased as herders lack animal feed.  Veterinary 
services have been significantly reduced; as a result, many livestock are not vaccinated, and 
so risk spreading diseases into neighbouring countries (FAO, 2016: 1).  
 The loss of animals, either by death due to lack of water, poor living conditions, killed or 
stolen is particularly high in Al-Hassakeh, Deir-ez-Zor, Lattakia, Quneitra and Rural 
Damascus (FAO, 2017: 9).  
 
Economy and production loss 
 Due to the scarcity of resources and the low natural productivity of inland fishery, the fishery 
and aquaculture sector plays a minor role in the Syrian economy (FAO, 2017: 10). 
 Before the crisis, the agricultural sector was a source of livelihood opportunities for half of the 
population (FAO, 2016: 1).  Today, agriculture remains a key part of the economy (ACU, 
2017; FAO, 2017: 2) - albeit severely weakened by six years of war. 
 Livestock also remains a main source of income in rural areas (FAO, 2017: 4): approximately 
80 per cent of non-IDP (internally displaced people) households still living in rural areas are 
involved in annual crop production; 60 per cent in perennial crop production, and 60 per cent 
also in livestock rearing (FAO, 2017: 4).  For IDP households, the percentages are lower 
(ibid). 
 The sector accounts for an estimated 26 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP), and 
represents a “critical safety net” for the 6.7 million Syrians, including IDPs and poor 
households, who still remain in rural and peri-urban areas (FAO Representation in Syria, 
2016; FAO, 2017: 4).  
 However, livestock registered the second largest share of lost economic production (after 
annual crops) (FAO, 2017: 5).  Conversely, this subsector accounted for the highest 
proportion of damage (as manifested in the value of livestock deaths) amounting to USD 5.5 
billion (FAO, 2017: 5 & 9). 
 ‘Counting the Cost’ figures estimate that USD 16 billion has been lost in terms of production 
(economic loss) overall (FAO, 2017: 5), along with damaged and destroyed assets and 
infrastructure within the agriculture sector. 
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3. Crop and food production 
 Although the agricultural sector still sustains 50 per cent of food supply in Syria (FAO 
Representation in Syria, 2016), food production is at a record low.  Figures show a reduction 
of 40 per cent, compared to pre-conflict levels (WFP, 2016).   
 The sector faces many difficulties, including: soaring prices of fuel (if available), especially in 
Aleppo and Idleb; the high cost of once-subsidised seeds and animal feed, and lack of 
specialised staff (ACU, 2017: 33; Mercy Corps, 2017).   
 Crop production is also impacted by high labour costs, shortages of workers, and fragmented 
markets, with disrupted supply chains (FAO, 2017: 5).   
 These limited and costly production activities are raising food prices, causing approximately 
half the population remaining in Syria are unable to meet their daily food needs (FAO, 2017: 
1).  Current analysis records the number of people in need (PiNs) as four million within 105 
assessed sub-districts (ACU, 2017: 11). 
 A decline in agricultural production was registered in the Al-Dana sub-district in Idleb due to 
the spread of IDP camps on a wide agricultural area (ACU, 2017: 29).   
 Regime forces do not allow farmers’ access to their land (ACU, 2017: 33; ESCWA & St. 
Andrews, 2017: 17).  Crop destruction is also an issue (FAO, 2017: 5): in the sub-district of 
Az-Zabdani in Rural Damascus the forces almost daily cut down the fruit trees, which 
constitute 90 per cent of farming in the sub-district (ACU, 2017: 33).   
 Agriculture, and the livelihoods that depend on it, have suffered heavy losses.  However, 
national survey results show that the number of households that have lost access to different 
types of assets necessary for crop and livestock production is relatively low at 10 per cent 
(FAO, 2017: 12). 
 The Syrian regime policy of ‘siege and starvation’ has increased awareness of the importance 
of farming all available agricultural spaces, even within city residential blocks (ACU, 2017: 
33).  To decrease reliance on low-quality and expensive smuggled vegetables, approximately 
a third of all residents in Rural Damascus survive by growing crops on rooftops after buying 
seeds from other areas, despite the high prices (Syria Untold, 2015).   
 Successful roof farming faces many obstacles, however, including: difficulty of moving earth 
to the roof without specialist equipment; the lack of water; difficulty in acquiring suitable 
seeds, as well as danger of aerial bombardment (ibid). 
 
Cereals and bread production 
 Wheat is one of “the most strategic crops” in Syria, as it is the base for flour used to make 
bread, which is a staple of the Syrian diet (WFP, 2016; Mercy Corps, 2017).   
 In general, wheat cultivation has followed an “up and down pattern”: the long-term trend was 
positive from 1966 to 2010 (Aw-Hassan et al., 2014: 205), however, after Syria’s wheat 
harvest reached 3.4 million tonnes in 2011, production fell to 1.7 million tonnes in 2016, as 
stated by government figures (Enab Baladi, 2017).   
 The ‘Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission’ conducted by the FAO and the WFP 
shows that the area planted with cereals in the 2015-16 cropping season was the smallest 
ever (FAO, 2015).   
 According to FAO Food Price Monitoring and Analysis data, the continued conflict in the main 
cereal producing areas (in the north east of the country) together with poor rainfall, decreased 
the 2016 wheat harvest by 37 per cent compared to the relatively good output of 2015.  This 
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was approximately 55 per cent lower than the pre conflict average from 2007-2011 (FAO 
FPMA, 2017).   
 Wheat output for 2017 is also expected to remain below the pre-conflict average level (FAO 
FPMA, 2017).  The Syrian Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform (MAAR) predicts that 
the wheat production in Al-Hassakeh
4
 for the current season will only reach 600,000 tonnes, 
compared to 1,471,000 tonnes in 2007, in an estimated area of 396,500 ha (3,965 km
2
), 
compared to 663,086 ha (6,631 km
2
) in 2007 (Enab Baladi, 2017). 
 This part of Syria is currently witnessing a conflict called “wheat battle,” which is no less 
important than the ongoing war between the conflicting parties in the region (ibid).   
 Nevertheless, the Economic Commission plans to buy 200,000 tonnes of wheat from farmers 
there this year, which will make the region achieve self-sufficiency in wheat (ibid).   
 Since the start of the crisis, infrastructures such as grain silos and flour mills have been 
destroyed (FAO, 2017: 5); 47 per cent of public bakeries have been damaged (ACU, 2017: 
25), increasing bread prices by up to 1000 per cent in the hardest hit areas (WFP, 2016).  
 The continuing war and climate changes has turned Syria from a country having a strategic 
self-sufficiency in wheat, to an importer (ESCWA & University of St. Andrews, 2017: 17).   
Vegetable growth and production 
 In Syria, vegetables such as cucumber and beans are generally ruled by market forces, 
including the absence of price support (Aw-Hassan et al., 2014: 211).  For these crops, 
differences between actual irrigation levels, profit maximising levels, and technically 
recommended levels are much narrower than for other crops, such as wheat (ibid).   
 Farmers have a lower incentive to focus on vegetable production because it entails greater 
risk; most vegetables need to be sold directly after harvest as vegetable prices fluctuate in 
line with market conditions (ibid).  
 As the state system that once purchased farmers’ crops has been restricted (Mercy Corps, 
2017), Syrian farmers have been encouraged to export fruit and vegetables to Russia since 
2016, according to media reports (Agroinfo, 2017).   
 By the end of 2017, the volume of exports of fruits and vegetables from Syria could be 6,000 
tonnes (ibid).  Next year, this figure could be increased by 12, or even 15 times (ibid). 
 
4. Current assistance programmes 
 Farming before the conflict was supported by the Syrian regime, which in turn received 
support from international organisations (ACU, 2017: 21).  The General Commission for 
Scientific Agricultural Research (GCSAR), which is affiliated with the Syrian government, is 
currently developing its research programmes in line with the nature of Syrian agriculture and 
its development priorities (Hanna, 2016). 
 Development projects started in many liberated areas in a trial to achieve stability in food 
security sector because humanitarian assistance provided did not meet civilians’ needs (ibid).   
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 The Al-Hassakeh governorate in the north east is considered as “the reservoir of strategic material for Syria” 
since it contributes to 36 per cent of wheat production in the country (Enab Baladi, 2017).   
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 Compared to previous monitoring results (DYNAMO 5), the percentage of assessed sub-
districts with active development projects increased from 41 to 62 per cent during the 
previous six months (ibid).   
 There is a possibility for establishing livestock development projects within 73 per cent of the 
assessed sub-districts (ACU, 2017: 29).  However, no active development livestock projects 
were found within 13 sub-districts in Al-Hasakeh, Ar-Raqqa, Dar’a and Eastern Aleppo where 
the livestock are in “miserable” conditions (ACU, 2017: 31). 
 Livestock development projects are implemented only in few sub-districts.  This is because 
food baskets do not include meat; most families cannot afford to buy meat because of its 
rarity and high price (ibid). This, among other factors, leads to undernutrition among civilians 
especially women and children (FAO Representation in Syria, 2016: 43; ACU, 2017: 31; FAO, 
2017: 9). 
 ACU are cooperating with Homs LC in supporting the agricultural sector and livestock care, 
especially after the big retreat in livestock production.  Two current Qatar-funded development 
projects include fattening sheep and calves, as well as providing livestock medicine, vaccines 
and fodder to cattlemen at low prices. 
 Croplands ready to be planted with strategic crops (such as potatoes, wheat and legumes) 
form 80 per cent of the assessed land area within assessed sub-districts (ACU, 2017: 29).  To 
date, 48 assessed sub-districts have been planted with these crops, mainly in Idleb, Aleppo 
and Rural Damascus (ibid).   
 Irrigation projects have been implemented in approximately a third (33 out of 105) of the 
assessed sub-districts (ACU, 2017: 34).  However, there are no details available concerning 
their successes. 
 Also, there are no active development projects present in 38 per cent of the assessed sub-
districts, including all the assessed sub-districts in BSG Ar-Raqqa and Deir-ez-Zor where 
humanitarian organisations are not allowed to work. 
 According to the latest DYNAMO study results, there are no agricultural pharmacies (that 
provide basic items needed for agriculture) within 24 sub-districts assessed, even though 19 
are agricultural sub-districts, and that there are stock-breeding activities in 15 of them (ACU, 
2017: 35).  Farmers in nine sub-districts with difficulties in access to agricultural pharmacies, 
include Areesheh in Al-Hassakeh, Tell Abiad in Ar-Raqqa, Banan and Maskana in Aleppo, 
and Kafr Nobol in Idleb (ibid). 
 The non-government, non-profit organisation Assistance Coordination Unit (ACU) aims to 
reinforce farmers' commitment to their lands by ensuring that their current crops are sold, by 
encouraging them to cultivate crops for the next season (winter crop support in Homs).  This 
programme can then provide flour for bread to areas in need (Hanna, 2016). 
 Since 2011, the FAO has been operating in 13 of Syria’s 14 governorates, supporting the 
livelihoods of more than two million Syrians in rural and peri-urban areas, through a wide 
range of development activities (FAO, 2016: 2).   
 Their ‘2016 Syria Humanitarian Response Plan’ (ibid) centres on: staple food production 
through seed distributions and training; support for winter cereal (e.g. wheat and barley) 
production; “Family farming” i.e. household nutrition and income support through backyard 
food production - kitchen garden kits include seeds and seedlings, fertiliser and basic tools to 
help families plant small vegetable allotments for their own consumption in both the summer 
and winter months (Mercy Corps, 2017). 
 Micro-gardening kits and poultry production packages are also provided for displaced 
families, as well as conditional cash assistance (FAO, 2016: 2).   
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 Programmes increasing and protecting livestock assets through vaccination and treatment 
campaigns, distribution of animal feed and small livestock, and building veterinary capacity 
have been minimising the risk of transboundary animal disease outbreaks (FAO, 2016: 1).   
 Rehabilitation of agricultural infrastructure is currently in operation.  In 2015, 222 famers were 
able to resume production on 33 ha (0.33 km
2
) of land thanks to the rehabilitation of solar-
powered irrigation systems (FAO, 2016: 2). 
 
5. Future considerations for development and recovery 
 The agricultural sector remains essential, and will be key to Syria’s future recovery (FAO, 
2016: 1).  However, between USD 11 and 17 billion
5
 is required to start the recovery (FAO, 
2017: 5).  Livestock sector recovery will account for 43–47 per cent of total recovery costs, 
depending on the scenario.
6
 
 Even though the crisis is not over, the conditions for investing in the recovery of the sector are 
present in many areas of the country (FAO, 2017: 14).  Such investment will not only reduce 
the need for humanitarian assistance, but also stem migration and encourage the return of 
migrants (ibid).  Increasing the number of development projects is necessary because 
provided humanitarian assistance still does not totally meet civilians’ needs (ACU, 2017: 29).  
 If productive farming areas are neglected, more people will be forced to leave already 
depopulated rural areas making eventual recovery harder, longer and more costly to achieve 
(FAO, 2017: 15).   
 Results show that rural households are very clear about what they require to enhance or 
resume their agricultural production; for annual crops, perennial crops and livestock the 
pattern is similar (FAO, 2017: 14).  This reflects a general assumption that agricultural 
production can be “kick-started” effectively, even under current conditions (ibid). 
 Local populations manage the largest percentage of development projects, along with local 
councils (LCs), local non-governmental organisations (LNGOs), and other authorities that also 
manage development projects.  International non-governmental organisations (INGOs) 
administrate some projects only within Jawadiyah sub-district in Al-Hassakeh, and Sahnaya in 
Rural Damascus (ACU, 2017: 30). 
 Therefore, the international community must also start addressing new ways of rebuilding 
livelihoods during a crisis.  Despite the potential of agriculture to address mounting food 
availability and access constraints, very little has been invested to support recovery of the 
sector.  Failure to provide adequate support will continue to exacerbate food insecurity, and 
irreversibly compromise agriculture-based livelihoods (FAO, 2017: 1). 
 Irrigation sources, which include rainwater, groundwater and surface water (e.g. river water), 
vary from one district to another (ACU, 2017: 34).  Therefore, an important consideration for 
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 Under a “no change” scenario, the assessment estimates that the costs over a three-year period would USD 11 
billion at 2016 prices. Due to an assumed partial return of rural migrants from urban areas and abroad, this total 
increases to USD 14.9 billion under a “partial return to peace” scenario, and to USD 17.1 billion under a 
“transition to peace” scenario (FAO, 2017: 14). 
6
 Annual crops account for 29–33 per cent and perennial crops 24–26 per cent, according to a formula which 
takes into account the level of damage which is estimated to have occurred combined with proportion of land 
covered (for irrigation only) (FAO, 2017:14 ).  These costs apply to a partial return to peace scenario (FAO, 2017: 
15). 
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recovery of the agriculture sector is need to adapt to reduced use of water for irrigation, 
while at the same time coping with increased temperatures and more frequent droughts 
(FAO, 2017: 17).  Climate smart agriculture must also be taken into account (FAO, 2017: 
19).   
 One possibility for the future is that some of the services formerly provided by the government 
(e.g. subsidy policies for fuel and price support) may be provided by the private sector.  As 
such, there will be a need to build the capacity of farmers to sell their own production through 
value chain approaches (post-harvest management, food processing and preservation and 
marketing), as well as promoting the development of income-generating activities (FAO, 
2017: 19). 
 Some charities and NGOs plan to eventually expand into animal husbandry, providing 
vocational training for breeders to raise sheep and goats and assist them with feed and 
forage (Mercy Corps, 2017).  Courses will also include instruction on cheese-making and food 
preservation (ibid). 
 The continuity of agriculture and stock-breeding requires nearby agricultural pharmacies.  
This is to provide fertilisers and seeds, as well as insecticides, veterinary medicines and other 
basic items needed for agriculture in addition to veterinary medicines (ACU, 2017: 35).  
 Fertiliser, which was previously produced locally, must now be imported due to disruptions in 
the market during the conflict (ibid).  High prices mean that many farmers are unable to afford 
it unless assistance programmes exist (Mercy Corps, 2017). 
 The high cost of needed items and veterinary medicines (if available) heads the considerable 
difficulties that agricultural pharmacies face in all assessed sub-districts, followed by 
unavailability of all the necessary items in addition to lack of specialised staff, which 
negatively affects agriculture and stock breeding (ibid).   
 Agricultural research is also important to consider.  Three agriculture research centres 
currently operate in Syria: the Agricultural Research Centre in Hama for seed development; 
GCSAR, which is operational in various provinces; and the International Centre for 
Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas (ICARDA) in southern Aleppo province (Hanna, 2016).  
 Planning for future harvests includes training farmers with the latest technology (Mercy 
Corps, 2017).  This is essential as most harvest machinery in Syria is at least 10-20 years old, 
having been imported second-hand from Europe, and are not very fuel-efficient (USDA 
Foreign Agricultural Service, 2012). 
 Training farmers, even those who have decades of experience, is necessary in order to focus 
on new ideas, and introduce scientific advances and discoveries.  Using native legume and 
wheat varieties, which are adapted to the Syrian environment and are drought- and disease-
resistant, will make it easier for farmers who would otherwise struggle to cultivate a new 
variety (Mercy Corps, 2017). 
 The farmers can discuss crop management, e.g. recognising and controlling disease or 
infestations (ibid).  Training on saving seeds from their vegetables to use again next season 
will increase yields, and allow farmers to sell their surplus in the local markets.  It will also 
prepare Syrians to return to farming their land once the war ends (ibid).   
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